With monotonous regularity since the late 1980s
NGOs, politicians or think tanks have predicted a water war could erupt any day now. Recently, a UK Minister predicted war in the middle run. 1 No such thing has happened, though, and prominent water scholars have argued 2,3 a war fought strictly over water is unlikely in the future. A clue to understanding this situation, we argue in its sequel 6 , is to look at what lies beneath:
how power is exercised. The 'water wars' discourse has simplistically focused on the exercise of hard power, predominantly violence and coercion. Both philosophical reasoning (Hannah Arendt) and empirically grounded hydropolitical work 7 has shown, however, that rule based on fear and brute power has little hope in the long term. Some kind of legitimacy and consent is needed to perpetuate any unequal power relation. Empirically, we find relations between riparians to be governed by a wider spectrum of power instruments, from side payments and bribery to persuasion and inciting desire to emulating success. This wide range of nonviolent, co-optative power manifestations is collectively known as 'soft power': getting others to want Cooperation by the non-hegemonic actor, or its compliance to certain states of affairs, does not necessarily mean consensus. Successful framing by the stronger party as the common good (soft power), however, can result in power differences going uncontested and countries signing treaties that bring highly differential benefits. Unqualified calls for and claims to transboundary cooperation 'of any sort, no matter how slight' 11 are therefore as wrongheaded as are alarms over water wars. Policy and programmes promoting unqualified "cooperation" were criticised on the grounds that negative forms of cooperation need reform or resolution, not management or encouragement.
The Hydro-hegemony framework is indebted to the Gramscian concept of hegemony as ingrained in material and ideational structures pervading social systems. Global Water Forum www.globalwaterforum.org | 3 while knowing full well the odds are stacked in their favour. States frame their water interest in non-contestable security terms. 15 Whether picked up, amplified and given material support, or purposely backgrounded, such discursive framing of issues matters.
An example may be helpful here. Egypt has long claimed a veto on any upstream 'arrest' of Nile waters for consumptive water use, through irrigation reservoirs, distribution systems and the like. Underpinned by one of the largest armies in the region, the national government has previously declared upstream dam-building to be a casus belli (a legitimate reason to start a war) should it lead to lower inflow into Egypt. 16 It could be argued that this threat prevented Ethiopia, the Blue Nile upstream power, building dams in the past; alternatively there is also the material reality that the country could hardly fund and realise its own dam infrastructure.
This penury is worsened by the stipulation of key multilateral funders that they will not fund transboundary projects that lack the endorsement of all riparian sates. The balance in favour of Egypt has also relied upon the moral and material support of the United States, to which it is one of the biggest allies in the region. 
